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Summary
The historical development of psychodynamic psychiatry
and its core principles were focussed on in the perspective
of current research, especially of neuroscientific research.
The three-dimensional model of psychodynamic and neu-
ro-psychodynamic psychiatry and spatiotemporal psy-
chopathology are described and applied to depression
and schizophrenia as clinical examples underlining the
practical relevance of the neuro-psychodynamic approach
for psychiatric treatment and psychotherapy. Operational-
ized psychodynamic diagnostics (OPD) is discussed as
an "instrument to transfer psychodynamic constructs into
neuroscience".
Keywords: Psychodynamic psychiatry, neurosciences,
three-dimensional model, spatiotemporal psychopatholo-
gy, depression, schizophrenia, Operationalized Psychody-
namic Diagnostics (OPD), therapeutic attitude
“The modern dynamic psychiatrist must strive to be bilin-
gual – the language of the brain and language of mind
must both be mastered in the service of knowing the person
and providing optimal patient care” (Gabbard 2014, p. 7)
[1].
Introduction
This paper focuses on the relationship between psycho-
dynamic psychiatry and neurobiology, especially on the
question of whether and how neurobiology may contribute
to the development of psychodynamic psychiatry. Mental
functions such as the self, the conscious and the uncon-
scious, and the psychological and neuronal mechanisms
and functions underlying these are focussed on [2]. The
self in psychiatric patients is considered in a relational per-
spective.
First, the historical development of psychodynamic psy-
chiatry is addressed and its core principles are reconsidered
in the perspective of current research, especially neurosci-
entific research.
Second, the three-dimensional model of neuropsychody-
namic psychiatry is described, which tries to connect the
essentials of psychodynamic psychiatry and of the “first-
person-neuroscience”. This model is applied to depression
and schizophrenia as clinical examples that underline the
practical relevance of the neuro-psychodynamic approach
for psychiatric treatment and psychotherapy.
Third, spatiotemporal psychopathology is hypothesised to
be a “current currency” between brain and mind.
The development of psychodynamic psychiatry
The term “psychodynamic psychiatry” generally refers to
an approach steeped in psychoanalytic theory and knowl-
edge. Psychodynamic theory has often been viewed as a
model that explains mental phenomena as the result of con-
flict. This conflict derives from unconscious wishes and
anxieties. Within the purview of psychodynamic psychia-
try is the unconscious internal world of relationships and
different mental representations of aspects of individuals
themselves and significant others.
During the course of the development of psychoanalysis,
psychodynamic theory has been related to a great variety
of theoretical sources and scientific approaches. Among
these the affect theory, the object relation theory, the results
of the early infant research, the studies on traumatic ex-
periences and, last but not least, neurobiology and neuro-
scientific approaches are of outstanding importance for the
modern psychodynamic psychiatrist.
Gabbard [1] emphasised that “Today's psychodynamic
clinician can no longer practice a type of psychiatry di-
vorced from the body and sociocultural influences” (p. 4).
Accordingly, psychodynamic psychiatry has to be regarded
today as situated within the overarching construct of
biopsychosocial psychiatry. The enormous progress in ge-
netics and neuroscience may have – paradoxically –
strengthened the position of psychodynamic psychiatry
and psychotherapy. There is more persuasive evidence
than ever before that a great many mental phenomena are
unconscious, that environmental factors shape the expres-
sion of genes, and that the mind reflects the activity of the
brain [3]. Critical neuroscientists focus on an integrative
rather than a reductive approach and recognise that psy-
chological data are just as valid scientifically as biological
findings.
Nevertheless, a critical epistemological point has to be tak-
en into account in this context: in view of the danger of
a possible reification of mental illness and a categorial er-
ror (the fallacy of treating an abstraction, such as the un-
conscious, as if it were a physical entity, measurable by
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neurobiological means), these developments and results of
the neurosciences should not be interpreted as scientifical-
ly valid arguments for the psychodynamic model.
In order to characterise the essence of psychodynamic psy-
chiatry Gabbard used the following definition: “Psychody-
namic psychiatry is an approach to diagnosis and treatment
characterized by a way of thinking about both patient and
clinician that includes unconscious conflict, deficits and
distortions of intrapsychic structures, and internal object
relations and that integrates these elements with contempo-
rary findings from the neurosciences” [1] pp 4–5.
Beyond the Cartesian notion of substance dualism and the
the growing evidence that mind and brain are inextricably
linked [4], there are still great challenges for the psychody-
namic clinician: How does the psychodynamic psychiatrist
integrate the domain of mind with the domain of brain, not
only from an epistemological perspective but in common
interactions with patients especially?
This question still presents a challenge to the psychody-
namic clinician, though presumed polarities – such as
genes versus environment, medication versus psychothera-
py, and biological versus psychosocial determants of psy-
chiatric disorders – are often “glibly subsumed under the
categories of brain and mind” [1].
Our minds certainly reflect the activity of the brain, but
mind cannot be reduced to neuroscientific explanations [5,
6]. Whereas the brain can be observed from a third-person-
perspective, the mind, on the other hand, can be known on-
ly from within: The first-person perspective has to be taken
into account. The construct of “explanatory dualism” [7]
acknowledges that there are two different ways of knowing
and understanding that require two different kinds of ex-
planation [6].
Facing the mind-brain problem, psychodynamic psychia-
try, as well as the neurosciences, are confronted with the
question “What is the person?”
The person defies easy categorisation. Gabbard sum-
marised the principal determinants of the person as “a
complex amalgam of multiple variables” [1] p. 7:
– The subjective experience of oneself (based on a unique
historical narrative that is filtered through speecifc
meanings);
– A set of conscious and unconscious conflicts (and the
associated defenses, representations and self-decep-
tions);
– A set of internalised interactions with others (that are
unconsciously reenacted, creating impressions in oth-
ers);
– Our physical characteristics;
– Brain as a product of genes in interaction with environ-




– Cognitive style and capacities.
In view of these multiple determinants of the person, psy-
chodynamic psychiatry aims at providing a conceptual
framework within which a wide range of treatment inter-
ventions are used (not only psychodynamic psychothera-
py) that depend on the assesment of the patient’s needs.
The empirical basis of the essential principles
of psychodynamic psychiatry
There are some principles derived from psychoanalytic
theory and technique that still provide an essenial orien-
tation to the psychodynamic psychiatrist. Their empirical
basis was investigated during recent decades, among oth-
ers via neuroscientific approaches. The following section
provides an overview of a multitde of results of empiri-
cal studies. These results ought not to be misunderstood
as direct proofs for certain principles of psychodynamic
psychiatry, nor should the categories “neural processes”
and “psychotherapy” directly be linked in a causative way.
Hence, similar results in different scientific fields, which
were generated by very different scientific approaches and
methodologies, may strengthen the plausibility of a scien-
tific model, such as the conceptualisation of some of the
essential principles of psychodynamic psychiatry.
The unique value of subjective experience
Psychodynamic psychiatry – in contrast to descriptive psy-
chiatry – conceptualises symptoms and behaviours as “the
final common pathway of highly personalised subjective
experiences that filter the biological and environmental de-
terminants of illness” [1].
Whereas the descriptive-phenomenological approach
mainly focuses on the question of whether a patient corre-
sponds to others who show congruent features, “psychody-
namic psychiatry essentially focuses on the history of sub-
jective experiences and the development of the symptoms
trying to understand, how the individual patient differs in
his particular life-history from others.
“Furthermore, psychodynamic psychiatry places para-
mount value on the patient’s internal world: fantasies,
dreams, hopes, wishes, fears, impulses, self-images, per-
ception of others, and psychological reactions to symp-
toms” [2].
Psychodynamic psychiatrists are curious about “the neu-
robiological and psychological, i.e. neurobiopsychological
or neuropsychodynamic mechanisms, which lead to the ‘fi-
nal common pathway’ of symptoms and behaviors; cen-
tral here is to address the question, how these mechanisms
were necessary to protect the interior world and how the
‘exterior’ world reflects the inner contents of the respec-
tive person” [2].
The unconscious
Psychodynamic psychiatry is a conceptual model of the
mind that includes the unconscious [8]. According to
Freud [9], “the unconscious in a psychoanalytic sense, the
dynamic or repressed unconscious, does not only operate
outside awareness but is extremely complex including dis-
tinct aspects of the persons’ self. It includes innate and in-
herently sexual and aggressive blind drives (i.e., the id),
most of its conscience and ego ideals (i.e., the superego),
and processes (perception, action, etc) that deal with real-
ity (i.e., the ego). The dynamic or repressed unconscious
mediates wishful, associative, instinctual primary process-
es” (see also [8]).
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Many studies from experimental and development psy-
chology have strengthened Freud´s description of uncon-
scious mental functioning [10]: “that at any given moment
consciousness includes only a small content, so that the
greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must
in any case be for very considerable periods of time in a
state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically uncon-
scious.”
Psychodynamic psychiatry views symptoms and behav-
iours as unconscious processes that defend against re-
pressed wishes and feelings. The unconscious may man-
ifest itself in the patient's nonverbal behaviour to the
clinician. These characteristic patterns of relatedness occur
outside the conscious, verbal, narrative memory [10].
Psychic determinism
The psychodynamic approach asserts that we are far more
restricted in our decisions than we think, and that we are
characters living out a script written by the unconscious
(e.g., determining the choices of marital partners and pro-
fession).
In the perspective of psychodynamic psychiatry, symptoms
represent adaptations to the demands of the unconscious
shaped by a mixture of early attachment, object relations,
defenses, disturbances in the development of the self and,
las tbut not least, biological and neurobiological factors:
symptoms and behaviour have meaning!
The causes of behaviour are both complex (overdeter-
mined) and multiple (“in the sense of their being alternate
sets of sufficient conditions” [11] p. 181). Psychodynamic
psychiatry conceptualises behaviour as the final result of
many conflicting forces that serve a variety of very differ-
ent functions corresponding both to the demands of reality
and to unconscious needs [1]. The psychodynamic psychi-
atrist’s task is to sort out which symptoms and behaviours
can or cannot be explained by psychodynamic factors.
The significance of the biography: temperament, per-
sonality and epigenetics
The aetiology and pathogenesis of psychiatric symptoms
are often linked to childhood events and relationship ex-
periences. The repetitive patterns of interaction within the
family are of great aetiological importance and contribute
to the development of self and personality. In a subgroup,
overt trauma such as incest or physical abuse, leads to
long-lasting disturbances in the adult personality.
Besides these personality traits, constitutional elements
have to be considered. Infant research [12] has revealed
several discrete constitutional temperaments in newborn
infants. These results and those of the so-called binding
research underlined the importance of the “fit” between
the temperament of the child and the temperament of the
parenting person (e.g., the hyperirritable child who does
reasonably well with a calm and low-key mother may do
poorly with a highly strung mother). This model of “good-
ness-of fit” avoids blaming either parents or children for
the latter’s behaviour problems or psychiatric symptoms
that may result [1].
Theories of childhood development have always been cen-
tral to psychodynamic psychiatry. Whereas Freud recon-
structed childhood development retrospectively based on
reports of adult patients in psychoanalysis, subsequent psy-
choanalytically inspired studies have investigated child-
hood development prospectively by means of direct infant
and child observation.
Stern [13–15] demonstrated that the infant seems to be
aware of the mother from the first days of life, thus ques-
tioning former theories of primary autism or an autistic
phase in the early development of the child. He described
five discrete senses of self, which he regarded as different
domains of self-experience (emergent or “body self”, core
self, subjective self, verbal or categorical self, and narra-
tive self), each of which remains for the entire life span and
operates in concert with the other existing senses of self.
He concluded that humans emerge from an “intersubjec-
tive matrix” that is the result of sensitive affective attune-
ment from mothers and caretakers, and emphasised that
human existence is a fundamentally social existence.
In contrast to object relations theory, attachment theory
posits that the goal of the child is not to seek an object
but rather to seek a physical state achieved by proximity to
the mother/caregiver [16, 17]. Attachment is a biologically
based bond between the child and the caregiver that is de-
signed to ensure the safety and survival of the child. Secure
attachment strongly influences the development of internal
working models of relationships, which are stored as men-
tal schemas and lead to experiences regarding expectations
of the behavior of others toward the self.
Attachment strategies are adopted in infancy and remain
relatively stable. Ainsworth et al. [18] found – in a lab-
oratory scenario (“strange situation”) – four different be-
havioural strategies involving the toddler's separation from
the caregiver: secure binding, avoidant behaviour, anxious-
ambivalent (or resistant) behaviour, and disorganised-dis-
oriented behaviour.
Further empirical studies showed that these attachment
patterns may continue into adulthood [19, 20]. Longitudi-
nal studies testing the stability of attachment classification
found many factors that may be associated with changes
in security from infancy to adulthood, including stressful
life events, parental death, social support, family function-
ing, divorce, and serious illness in either parents or chil-
dren [20]. A large body of empirical evidence suggests that
disorganised attachment is a vulnerability factor for later
psychiatric disturbance (e.g., certain types of personality
disorder) and that attachment security, on the other hand,
can serve as a protective factor against adult psychopathol-
ogy [21].
Mentalisation, a key concept in attachment theory, refers
to the capacity to understand that one’s own and others
thinking is representational in nature and that one’s own
and other’s behaviour is motivated by internal states, such
as thoughts and feelings [17, 22]. Through the interaction
with the caregiver, the child learns that behaviour can best
be understood by assuming that ideas and feelings deter-
mine a person’s actions. Mentalising may be referred to the
“theory of mind”, the ability to understand the minds of
others [23]. Of course, this ability is also an essential fun-
dament of psychotherapy. Mentalising and empathy have
gained an increasing importance in neuroscience. Neuroi-
magng studies suggest that the medial prefrontal cortex,
the temporal poles, the cerebellum and the posterior-supe-
rior temporal sulcus may be involved of components of a
mentalisation network [23, 24].
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Another approach which is relevant for the historical-de-
velopmental aspects of psychodanamic psychiatry is repre-
sented by the embodied cognitive science.
Inspired by biology and the life sciences, embodied cogni-
tive science currently understands human organism – and
the human psyche – “as being in an ongoing (embodied)
state of change involved in constant dynamic processes
of interaction with the environment in which a continu-
ous process of recategorising experiences occurs. Memo-
ries of earlier situations unconsciously determine present
thought, feelings, and action, though not in the sense of
stored knowledge in analogy to a computer or static mem-
ory traces. In contrast memories are products of dynamic,
complex constructions in the here and now. In the sense of
embodiment, sensorimotor coordinations in the present al-
ways operate in an analogue manner as was the case in ear-
lier situations” [25].
In contrast to former tendencies towards genetic reduc-
tionism, the developmental perspective of psychodynamic
thinking has been supported by recent studies on epige-
netics. Personal identity does not overlap with genomic
identity [26]. Genes are in a constant interplay with the
environment, and DNA is not destiny. For example, mono-
cygotic twins with identical genomes can be highly distinct
individuals, and we can move beyond the nature-nurture
debate, because “it is now clear that DNA is both inherited
and environmentally responsive” [27].
Contemporary genetic research and neurobiological stud-
ies of brain plasticity have shown that genes are highly reg-
ulated by environmental signals throughout life [28].
Primate research has been particularly useful in demon-
strating the protective influence of early experiences in-
volving social attachment relationships (e.g., to overcome
the inborn vulnerability to separation anxiety [29]; or to
adapt to the possible negative effects of the short allele of
the HTTT gene [30].
Meaney and his colleagues [31–33] demonstrated that the
expression of genes regulating glucocorticoid receptors is
enhanced as a result of the grooming behaviour (of the
rat mothers). In concert with this enhanced expression is
a suppression of genes regulating corticotropin-releasing
factor synthesis: i.e., grooming behaviour, which goes
along with an inreased care of the pups, provides them
with a life-long protection from stress. This maternal be-
haviour is transmitted across generations without alteration
of the genome. This transmission is referred to as epigenet-
ic modifying or programming and is related to differences
in DNA methylation [33].
Much of the research on the interplay between genes and
the environment is finding counterparts in humans. For ex-
ample, there are windows in time during which a gene is
dependent upon a certain type of environmental influence
to determine its expression [34].
Transference
Transference determines the relationship between the pa-
tient and the therapist in every psychotherapeutic en-
counter: “Regardless of whether psychodynamic or clas-
sical psychoanalytic treatments are concerned, there is
always an unconscious transference. Also with behavioral
therapy techniques, transference phenomena occur, even if
they are named differently. Transference is, for example,
positively or negatively noticeable when expectations, de-
sires, feelings and behavior manifest themselves in a form
which does not correspond to the real relationship in an en-
counter situation and cannot be explained from it; in other
words emotional attitudes of the patient to the therapist or
to other persons in the present which were originally refer-
ring to childhood but which are unconsciously transferred
to the present” [35].
Freud [36] answered the question “What are the transfer-
ences?” thus: “These are reprints, imitations of the impuls-
es and phantasies that are to be aroused and made aware
during the advancement of the analysis with a person's
characteristic replacement of a former person by the physi-
cian. To put it another way: A whole series of earlier psy-
chological experiences is not experienced as a past, but as
a current relationship to the person of the physician.”
The original concept of transference was extended in the
following decades [37], “so that the transference encom-
passes almost all aspects emotions and attitudes that con-
stitute the patient's relationship with the therapist and the
therapeutic environment. In this extended use, it is useful
to refer the term ‘transference’ to the therapeutical en-
counter with patients suffering from different mental disor-
ders including the psychoses” [35].
Neuroscientific research contributes to understanding so-
cial interaction in general. Recent studies have illustrated
the decisive role of the so-called mirror neuron system,
which enables human beings to identify immediately with
the observed behavior and the mental state of others [38].
In the context of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, this
was related to transference: “...this means that during in-
teraction with the analysand, analogue sensorimotor coor-
dinations take place within the analyst as in the analysand
implying that unconscious processes of immediate identi-
fication are occurring” [25].
“But also in this context, one has to be aware of a common
fallacious reasoning, which again includes a category error.
The term mirror is, however, to use metaphorically. The
same could be said for transference. Bringing both together
is using the terms in their primary sense (forgetting their
metaphorical nature), and merging concepts of different
categories (neurons/neurobiology with transference/psy-
chology).”
To sum up, from a neurobiological perspective, transfer-
ence is related to internal representations of objects trig-
gered by real characteristics of the therapist: “Representa-
tions exist as a network of neurons that can be activated in
tandem” [39].
Countertransference
The transference of the patient and the countertransference
of the psychiatrist are essentially identical processes: Each
unconsciously experiences the other as someone from the
past [1]. Freud’s narrow definition [36] referred to the an-
alyst’s transference to the patient or the analyst’s response
to the patient’s transference. The emergence of unresolved
conflicts from the analyst’s unconscious is implicitly sup-
posed in this conceptualisation:
“We have become aware of the countertransference which
comes to the physician by the influence of the patient on
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the unconscious feeling of the physician, and are not far
from raising the demand that the physician must recognize
and cope with countertransference” [36] p. 108).
Today, in contrast, a broader definition of countertrans-
ference as the therapist’s conscious and appropriate emo-
tional reaction to the patient is gaining greater acceptance,
“subsuming all the emotional reactions that the patient
causes in the therapist. This broader definition particularly
helps to understand the therapeuical processes in the treat-
ment of patients with severe personality disorders and psy-
choses. This modified and broader conceptualisation views
countertransference as a major diagnostic and therapeutic
tool that enables a deeper insight into the patient's internal
world” [35].
Resistance
Resistance involves the patient’s wish to preserve the sta-
tus quo and to oppose the therapist’s efforts to produce in-
sight and change: “The resistance accompanies the treat-
ment step by step. Every single association, every act of
the patient under the treatment must reckon with the resis-
tance and represents a compromise between the forces that
are striving for recovery and the opposing ones” [36] p.
103.
Resistances to treatment may take many forms (e.g., being
late to appointments, refusing to take medication, being
silent in therapy sessions, focussing on unimportant mater-
ial during the sessions, etc.) and have in common the wish
to avoid unpleasant feelings (anger, guilt, envy, shame,
etc.).
In the framework of psychodynamic psychiatry, the chal-
lenging question is what resistance is protecting and which
past situation is being reenacted: “The manner in which the
patient resists is likely to be a re-creation of a past relation-
ship that influences a variety of present-day relationships”
[1] pp 22–23.
The synopsis of the quoted empirical studies underlines the
neurobiological basis for the essential principles of psy-
chodynamic psychiatry, especially for the psychodynamic
concepts of the unconscious (or procedural) memory, at-
tachment, internalisation, identification and transference.
Three-dimensional model of psychodynamic
psychiatry
One hundred years ago, it had been logical to look for
the necessary supplement of descriptive psychiatry in psy-
choanalysis, which had dealt with the psychic drives and
energies and unconscious motivations beyond the exterior
phenomena [2]: “Freud hoped to be able to develop a sys-
tematology according the transferred paradigm of medi-
cine. He started from the concept of nosological entities,
which get along with certain and always equal causes,
pathogeneses, symptoms, courses, and therapeutic speci-
ficities” [2].
Freud (1926) assumed a specific intrapsychic conflict,
which would underlie the respective disorder: “These dis-
orders on the basis of unconscious inner conflicts were
called neuroses. Freud regarded the correlated symptoms
and syndroms as parts of mechanisms of defence and com-
pensation and therefore also as – inadequate – compromis-
ing trials to solve conflicts” [2]. It was assumed that the
phenomenology of the so-called psychoneuroses serves the
symbolic expression of psychic conflicts [37], whose ori-
gins were localised in childhood.
Mentzos [40, 41] stressed that the emphasis on symbolisa-
tion as the most decisive differential criterion of the psy-
choneuroses compared with other forms of neuroses is ap-
plicable, but not sufficient. That is, “symbolic patterns of
expression also get along with other psychic disturbances,
e.g., anorexia, psychosomatic disorders of the skin or with
psychoses. In order to be able to differentiate psychoneu-
roses sufficiently, rather the different maturational levels of
symbolism have to be taken into account, e.g., the matura-
tional level of the personality organisation and of the de-
fence mechanisms, furthermore also the kind of the con-
flict has to be considered” [2]. Subsequent to the drive
conflicts (especially the triadic or oedipal conlict), which
were focused on by the early psychoanalysis, “the later self
psychological, object relational, and intersubjective devel-
opments of psychoanalysis during the last decades point
to further relevant dimensions far beyond the original con-
flict” [42].
Finally, the multidimensionality of the single case has to be
taken into accout [43, 44].
The overcoming of the former concepts concerning hy-
pothesised conflict specific conditions in psychoneuroses,
or finally also in obsessive-compulsve disorders, neurotic
depression, and phobias became necessary [42]: “The ex-
pected constellations of conflict, defense and symptoma-
tology – according the former concept of nosological enti-
ties – could not be validated empirically.”
In view of a necessary new orientation, Mentzos [41] pro-
posed a three-dimensional diagnosis, which enables char-
acterisation of each individual case with regard to three
psychodynamic dimensions or criteria:
“The first dimension refers to the mode of defense and
compensation of the conflict ad/or the trauma. The second
dimension concerns the specific features and the level of
the conflict or dilemma (e.g. self identity vs. symbiosis as
an “immature” conflict contrary to the “mature” oedipal
conflict). The third dimension refers to the level of the per-
sonality organisation, especially to the relationship to sig-
nificant others or to one´s own self” [42].
In summary, the development of a three-dimensional diag-
nostics for psychiatric disorders was necessary, “because
similar psychic disorders differ from one another in regard
to psychogenesis, conflict, and developmental level and no
conflict specifity referring to the occurrence of psychic dis-
orders could be stated” [42].
Neuropsychodynamic psychiatry: three-di-
mensional neuropsychodynamic model
On the basis of Mentzos’ three-dimensional model encom-
passing the psychodynamic dimensions mechanisms of de-
fence and compensation, structure and conflict [42], an
analogous model was developed in the context of neu-
ropsychodynamic psychiatry, integrating the current
knowledge of neurobiology and neural mechanisms [2,
42].
“Neuropsychodynamic psychiatry” may be understood as
an extension and specification of psychodynamic psychi-
atry: “Neuropsychodynamic psychiatry focuses on mental
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functions such as the self, the ego, the conscious and the
unconscious, and the psychological and neural mecha-
nisms and functions underlying these. The epistemiologi-
cal possibilites and limitations of neuroscientific approach-
es concerning the core questions about the self and
interpersonal relationships with significant others are ad-
dressed. The self in psychiatric patients is considered in
a relational perspective, and the relational connecting
processes between the brain and the environment are ex-
amined. The empirical plausibility of this relational defin-
ition of the self and brain presents a particular challenge”
[2].
The dimension of defence and coping “describes certain
modes of intrinsically predisposed mechanisms for pro-
cessing extrinsic life-events” [42].
Boeker and Northoff [42] described the intrinsic activity of
the brain as a dynamic balance between “different neuronal
networks, for instance the default mode network, the exec-
utive network, the sensorimotor network, the attention net-
work and the language network. These different networks
are found in various regions. They are related to one an-
other in a specific way: the default mode network (DMN)
may be characterised particularly by the midline structures
of the brain, whereas the executive network (EN) covers
lateral pre-frontal and parietal regions. Functional imaging
studies showed that both these networks are related to one
another in a negative way, anti-correlating with one anoth-
er. For instance, the activation of the DMN leads to a re-
duced activation of the EN and vice-versa. If the EN is
strongly activated, for instance by cognitive processes, the
activity in the DMN is reduced and the associated emo-
tions or self-specific processes may be recruited in only a
limited way. Because of the balance between different net-
works, there are pre-determined mechanisms, by means of
which extrinsic stimuli and tasks may be processed.”
It may be hypothesised from a neural perspective, that “the
different modes of defence and compensation of conflicts
and/or traumata are analogue to the resting state spatiotem-
poral structures’ ability to modulate and adapt as well as to
the resting state’s self-specific organisation” [42].
In this model of “spatiotemporal psychopathology” [43]
“two different spatiotemporal axes are important: a longi-
tudinal axis with a very long spatiotemporal scale, possibly
reaching back into early childhood. Secondly, the mode of
processing of the conflict or trauma depends on the interac-
tion between a certain life-event at a specific time with the
spatiotemporal structures of the involved conflicts or trau-
mata” [42].
Second dimension: conflict. The challenging question is,
“how can the extrinsic-intrinsic interaction between the ex-
ternal reality and the internal psychic reality be translat-
ed into the neuronal context of the brain?” [42]: “The psy-
chic conflict in a neuropsychodynamic perspective may be
characterised as an interaction between the intrinsic resting
state activity and the extrinsic stimuli, as resting state stim-
ulus interaction or stimulus resting state interaction” [42].
Boeker and Northoff point to one limitation of this model:
“resting stimulus and stimulus resting state interaction de-
scribe specific mechanisms resulting from the interaction
between intrinsic activity and an extrinsic stimulus. In con-
trast, conflict in a psychodynamic perspective is more a re-
sult than a mechanism” [42].
Third dimension: structure. The dimension of structure fo-
cusses on the “organisation of the personality and the psy-
chic structure of the subject including her/his relationship
to the object and to the self” [42 (see also [44, 45]).
An anology between the psychic structure of the person-
ality and the spatiotemporal structure of the brain may be
hypothesised. Therefore the extrinsic activity of the brain
and the brain’s intrinsic activity have to be differentiated:
“The extrinsic activity of the brain focusses on the neu-
ronal activity, which is triggered by certain extrinsic stim-
uli or tasks. This extrinsic activity should be differentiated
from the brain’s own activity which develops in the brain
independently of extrinsic stimuli. This intrinsic activity is
paradoxically called resting state activity” [42].
A specific spatiotemporal structure of the intrinic activity
can be assumed: “This spatiotemporal structure is most
probably constituted by the interaction between different
networks and regions and the interaction between different
fluctuations in different frequencies (0.001–180 Hz) ... it
may be hypothesised that this spatiotemporal structure is
essential for the transformation of purely neuronal process-
es into subjective experiences and phenomenal processes.
Only if a certain extrinsic stimulus or task is integrated into
this intrinsic activity, can something be consciously expe-
rienced” [42] (see also [8, 46, 47].
A further analogy between the psychodynamic and the
neuronal level may be hypothesised, it concerns the self-
and object-specificity: “Intrinsic activity and its spatiotem-
poral structure show a strong overlap with the neuronal
processes which underlie self-experience and are also at
the same time greatly influenced by the outside world and
its extrinsic stimuli. There is much evidence that particu-
larly the midline regions show a strong overlap between
intrinsic activity and activity by means of self-related stim-
uli (for instance by saying one’s own name). This is on-
ly possible if specific self-related information is decoded
by the intrinsic activity and its spatiotemporal structure.
On the other hand, neuroimaging studies have shown that
the intrinsic activity and its spatiotemporal structure may
be strongly influenced by the outside world, especially by
stressful life-events. Thus, intrinsic activity and its spa-
tiotemporal structure would appear to fulfil the criteria for
self- and object-specificity analogous to the structure in the
psychodynamic context” [42].
Depression and schizophrenia as examples of
the interrelationship between psychodynamic
and neurobiological perspectives
Depression and schizophrenia were focussed on as exam-
ples of the interrelationship between psychodynamic and
neurobiological perspectives towards psychopathological
phenomena (“The decoupling of the self in depression”, for
further details see [45, 48–53]; “The concept of cathexis
and paraconstruction in schizophrenia”, see [54]).
As we have stated in our former publications, the devel-
opment of neuropsychodynamic hypotheses of the altered
self-reference in depression was based on the investiga-
tion of the emotional-cognitive interaction in depressed
patients [48]. These studies had focussed on the neuro-
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physiological correlates of depressive inhibition and the
neurophysiological substrates of negative cognitive
schemes (overview in Böker and Northoff [48, 54, 55], for
further details see [56–75].
On the basis of these neuroimaging studies, depression
may be characterised “by reduced neuronal activity in the
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and increased activity in
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The neuronal activ-
ity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can not be mod-
ified by emotional valence. The severity of depression cor-
relates with the activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex. Connected with the reduced deactivation in the pre-
genual ACC (default mode network), depressed persons
can not shift their attention from themselves to the outside
world” [48] (see also [69, 76, 77]).
Furthermore, it may be concluded “that the increased nega-
tive self-attributions – as as typical characteristics of an in-
creased self-focus in depression – may result from altered
neuronal activity in subcortical-cortical midline structures
in the brain (especially from hyperactivity in the cortical-
subcortical midline regions and hyperactivity in the lateral
regions” [48] (see also 77–79].
The focus on both psychodynamic and neurobiological di-
mensions maybe very helpful in the treatment of depressed
patients (see case vignette below). The essentials of neuro-
scientifically informed perspectives in the psychotherapy
of depression are summarised in table 1.
In schizophrenia, many neuroimaging studies showed
aberrant neuronal functions, especially hyperactivity and
hyperconnectivity of the DMN (default mode network) in
schizophrenic persons and also in their first-degree rela-
tives (for an overview see [87], further details in [2, 54,
88]). Contrary to healthy persons [89] “the balance of the
connectivity between DMN and CEN changes, depending
on the amount of abnormally high resting state activity and
hyperconnectivity in the CMS” [54] (see also [64, 65, 90,
91].
Abnormal anterior-to-posterior connectivity is related to
self-specificity processing in patients with schizophrenia
[92]. The result of these dysfunctional activation patterns
can be observed on the phenomenal level: “the change or
even deterioration of the consciousness of the self” [54].
From a psychodynamic perspective, people with schizo-
phrenia suffer from self-fragmentation [45, 93], which may
be seen as a “trans-phenomenal concept underlying anom-
alous subjective experiences” [54]. Schizophrenic pa-
tientss lose the clear distinction between internal and exter-
nal mental content (“self-environment blurring” [54]) or,
in psychdynamic terms, a loss of boundary cathexis takes
place [94]. Mentzos’ concept of the “schizophrenic dilem-
ma” between self-relation and object-relation [41] may al-
so be referred to in this neuropsychodynamic context.
The psychotherapist of the psychotic patient is directly in-
volved in the patient’s dilemma, i.e., there may be the dan-
ger of developing a countertransference resistence: “...the
common countertransference is impatience, fear, anger,
and feelings of distance, because the therapist has to bear
the psychotic disintegration of his patient” [87]. When
treating psychotic patients therapists can benefit from these
neurobiological and psychodynamic perspectives, when
they have in mind “the imagination of abnormal neuronal
events in the brain of their psychotic patients, e.g. hyper-
connnectivity and DMN–CEN imbalance. The danger of
their own self-fragmentation will then be reduced. By con-
sidering not only the phenomenal, but also the neuronal
perspective, the therapist’s paradigm can be changed, re-
sulting in a reduction of his countertransference-resistance
Table 1: Main essentials of neuroscientifically informed perspectives in the psychotherapy of depression*.
Dysfunction of the cortical midline structures (CMS)
Induced neural arousal (hyperactivity CMS)
Hypoactivity DLPF
Disturbed self referential processing












Adequate timing of therapeutic interventions
Increasing focus on conflictuous patterns of self worth regulation and relationship expectations
Psychotherapeutic maintenance therapy in chronic depression
Indication: individual-oriented (personality structure, traumatisation, coping mechanisms, relationship patterns, severity of symptoms, course of depression, motivation)
Synergistic effects of pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy: top-down and bottom-up
Main aim of psychotherapy: overcoming defensive strategies and vicious intraindividual and interpersonal circles
Depression-specific treatment approaches (CBT, IPT, STPT, CBASP)
Psychoanalytic psychotherapy conributes to an adaequate treatment of depressed patients, whose structurally based dynamics of intrapsychic and/or interpersonal conflicts
triggers depressive episodes and contributes to the chronification of the depressive disorder [80]
Stepwise application of different therapeutic interventions considering state- and trait-variables
Therapeutic relationship is of outstanding importance!
Time factor, network dynamics, and gene expression: sufficient long duration of treatment is necessary!
Further development of differential indication on the basis of functional subtypes (considering psychodynamic and neurobiologic dimensions)
CBASP = cognitive behavioural analysis system of psychotherapy; CBT = cognitive behviural therapy; CMS = cortical midline structures; DLPF = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
IPT = interpersonal psychotherapy; STPT = Short Time Psychodynamic Therapy * Focus on and consider cf [80–86].
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his being the case, more therapists could attempt to treat
psychotic patients neuro-psychodynamically” [87].
The future emphasis should be “to find treatment methods
which are able to connect self-fragments together or in oth-
er words, which strengthen or even restore the spatio-tem-
poral structure of the self” [54], “bottom-up”, e.g., with
antipsychotic medication and “top-down” by means of
psychotherapy, “which may have an additional influence
on neuronal activity in CMS (cortical midline structures)”
[54].
Operationalized psychodynamic diagnostics
(OPD) as an “instrument to transfer psychody-
namic constructs into neuroscience”
The system of operationalized psychodynamic diagnostics
(OPD; for further details see [95]) aims at broadening the
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) and diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) classifications by in-
cluding essential psychodynamic dimensions and at the
same time remaining aspects of reliability apparent in the
descriptive-phenomenological instruments.
Besides its use in psychotherapy training and psychother-
apy research, OPD was used as an instrument to “transfer
psychodynamic constructs into neuroscience” [96].
Buchheim et al. (HANSE-NEURO-Study [97]) investigat-
ed neural activation patterns in the course of psychothera-
py in depressed patients; they found changes in prefrontal-
limbic function in major depression after 15 months of
long-term psychotherapy.
In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
functional brain changes in patients with depression were
explored using individualised stimuli [98, 99].
The fMRI data were collected during free association to
emotionally significant sentences and two groups were
compared: (a) individuals with the association reflecting a
possible psychodynamic conflict; (b) individuals in whom
no sign of conflicts was foung in their associations [100].
The conlict group exhibited stronger activation in the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is involved in emotion
processing and conflict monitoring: “Thus OPD was used
post hoc to deliver a psychodynamic interpretation of brain
activity” [100].
Kessler et al. [101] investigated behavioural and psy-
chophysiological reactions to conflict-related and individ-
ualised stimuli as potential correlates of repression in a
group of healthy female subjects. Sentences were generat-
ed from individual OPD-based interviews.
Furthermore, OPD has been used in the context of therapy
planning, psychotherapy evaluation, psychotherapy train-
ing and psychotherapy research:
Jakobsen et al. [102] described results of long-term psy-
choanalytic psychotherapy in specific psychic disorders.
They found a significant improvement of symptoms and
of interpersonal relationships in patients with affective dis-
orders, anxiety disorders, obsessive-sompulsive disorder
(OCD), dissociative and somatoform disorders, and per-
sonality disorders.
Leichsenring et al. [103] found changes in personality
functioning after inpatient psychodynamic psychotherapy
using a dimensional approach to personality disorders.
Dinger et al. [104] investigated the change of emotional
experience in major depression and borderline personality
disorder (BPD) during psychotherapy. They found that
lower levels of personality functioning in depressed pa-
tients with BPD are associated with a broader spectrum of
negative emotions.
Ehrenthal et al. [105] investigated psychosocial variables
that influence chronic diseases, such as type 2 diabetes
mellitus. They found that levels of personality functioning
and not depression predict decline of plasma glucose con-
centrations in type 2 diabetes mellitus.
Bröcker et al. [106] performed an OPD-2-based study fo-
cussing on the course of treatment of patients with non-af-
fective psychosis (“Modified Psychodynamic Psychother-
apy for patients with schizophrenia - a Randomized
Controlled Efficacy Study”). The aim of this study was to
compare the predictive value of the Metacognitive Asses-
ment Scale-Abbreviated (MAS-A) and the “levels of struc-
tural integration” of the OPD-2 with regard to psychoso-
cial functioning of patients with non-affective psychoses.
The resuts underlined that “levels of structural integration,
including the quality of internalised object representations
and unconscious interpersonal schemas might ...be con-
sidered as valuable predictorsof social functioning and as
one therapeutic focus in patients with non-affective psy-
choses.”
Several OPD-based studies have contributed essentially to
depression and treatment research:
Kaufhold et al. [107] described the conflict dynamics in
chronic depression on the basis of the results of the conflict
and structure axis using the OPD (in the LAC study). A to-
tal of 217 patients with chronic depression were assed be-
fore the beginning of treatment. The results underlined a
moderating effect of the structure on the processing of con-
flicts and referred to the influence of experienced losses in
chronic depression.
Leuzinger-Bohleber et al. [108] investigated symptomatic
and structural changes of the outcome of cognitive-behav-
ioural and psychoanalytic long-term treatments by means
of the OPD and the Heidelberg Structural Change Scale
(HSCS in the LAC Depression Study, a large multicentre
study. Both psychotherapies led to highly significant
changes in the depressive symptoms 3 years after the be-
ginning of treatment. Furthermore, the results underlined
the transformation processes, namely the structural
changes, in psychoanalytical treatments.
In the Zurich Depression Study [84, 109–111], individ-
ualised stimuli were used to investigate neural emotion
processing in the course of psychodynamic psychotherapy
of depressed patients. In contrast to former studies which
used OPD-generated sentences, the Interpersonal Relations
Picture System (IRPS [110] was developed using the Mal-
adaptive Interpersonal Patterns Q-Sort (MIPQS) to com-
pose a system of pictorial stimuli. The MIPQS is based
on the 32 items of the interpersonal relations axis of the
OPD-2 [95]. The pen drawings of stick figures illustrate
situations with interpersonal behaviour patterns.
Before and after 6 and 12 months of psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy, self-assessment questionnaires, task-related
and resting state fMRI and magnetic resonance spec-
troscopy were applied. First, the neurobiological underpin-
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nings of reflecting on oneself and others in relationships
were investigated in a control group of healthy partic-
ipants. A modulation of brain activation in the right
parahippocampus, the insula bilaterally, the left precuneus,
bilaterally in the fusiform gyrus, and the left pre- supple-
mentary motor areal was found [95].
Part of the Zurich Depression Study was the analysis of
a sample of depressed and healthy participants, in which
functional connectivity (FC) was explored during the recall
of formative relationship episodes using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging [111]. Depressive symptoms were
associated with increased functional connectivity of brain
regions that form an interoceptive socio-affective network,
such as of the precuneus, the anterior insula, dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex, left amygdala, and medial prefrontal cor-
tex, early adversity was linked to decreased functional con-
nectivity in brain regions mediating emotion processing
and increased functional connectivity of the parahip-
pocampus.
Wade-Bohleber et al. [111] concluded that depression and
early adversity are associated with differential functional
connectivity patterns in the brain during the recall of for-
mative relationship episodes: “Hyperactivity of the intero-
ceptive socio-affective network associated with depressive
symptoms may link to enhanced self-focus and emotional
reactivity. Patterns of neural activation associated with ear-
ly adversity may underpin numbed affective states or en-
hanced affective memory regulation.”
A vignette of a depressed patient who was included in the
Zurich Depression Study and who was treated with psy-
choanalytic psychotherapy demonstrates the use of OPD
diagnosis in the course of the treatment:
Ms. N., a woman in her 30s, was facing a severe depressive
episode that slowly developed after the death of her part-
ner. She felt sad, hopeless and guilty, and suffered from
pronounced difficulties in sleeping. She could not enjoy
any of her formerly liked activities, having self-doubts and
blaming herself. It had become increasingly difficult for
her to maintain her job and social life.
In the psychoanalytic psychotherapy that she then began,
her experiences in the relationship with her deceased part-
ner became a major theme during the first months. Her
relationship with her partner had been accompanied by
ambivalent feelings. She had typically conformed to his
wishes, leaving aside her own, and she felt stuck with
feelings of anger towards him. Miss N. gradually linked
these experiences to certain repetitive feelings, perceptions
and interpersonal constellations that she had experienced
throughout childhood and youth.
Her father was an alcoholic who had been indifferent to the
patient and her brother. He tended to be aggressive, some-
times loosing self control. The relationship with the moth-
er was closer, especially in “good moments”, but remained
highly ambivalent, because her mother’s behaviour fluctu-
ated widely between near and distance, often intrusive and
irritating.
In the further course of the therapy the patient remembered
the “dark athmosphere” in her childhood which was also
connected with the sexual abuse by one of her uncles. She
felt anger, pain and shame at not having been protected by
her parents. She suffered from anhedonia, a lack of any
perspectives (“life flashes by”), being unable to enter into
a new partnership.
The therapy targeted five OPD focusses [95] (according to
the Heidelberg Structural Change Scale/HSCS):
1. Dysfunctional relationship patterns,
2. Conflicts of self value,
3. Conflicts of guilt,
4. Affect tolerance, and
5. Use of introjected objects and separation.
The patient felt supported by the therapist and gained more
and more self confidence. The therapeutic interventions
were modified in the further course of the treatment.
Whereas the holding function and affect attunement were
the fundament of the development of the therapeutic rela-
tionship, especially in the beginning, clarification and in-
terpretation of basic conflicts became more important in
the following steps of the therapeutic process. The depres-
sive symptoms remitted completely after two years of psy-
chotherapy. Ms. N. could distance herself (especially from
her mother and other persons who had neglected her), was
able to express her needs, developed a more positive self
image, and realised her professional and emotional capaci-
ties.
In view of the structural aspects of the personality and the
traumatic experiences that had been connected with the
development of the depressive psychopathology, the psy-
chotherapy was continued and conceptualised as a long-
term psychoanalytic psychotherapy in order to work
through the unconscious conflicts of the patient and to pro-
mote her separation process towards a greater autonomy.
Future perspectives: “common currency” be-
tween experience and brain?
Unlike biological psychiatry, which focuses on the brain it-
self independent of its respective ecological context, psy-
chodynamic psychiatry emphasises the integration of ex-
perience including the subject of experience within the
ecological context of the world [2].
Closing the gap between experience and brain is central
for psychiatry since we need to understand the processes
that transform abnormal neuronal into phenomenal states
which psychiatric patients experience in first-person per-
spective. Northoff [46] focussed on these transformative
processes such as neuronal-phenomenal transformation
and proposed a shared overlap or “common currency” be-
tween neuronal and phenomenal states that drives the
transformation of the former into principles of psychody-
namic psychiatry [46, 112].
Biological psychiatry, neurobiology, psychodynamic psy-
chiatry, and psychoanalysis suppose different models. Psy-
choanalysis focuses on structure and form as well as on
psychodynamic and mental mechanisms like defense
mechanisms. Biological psychiatry focusses on symptoms
as mental alterations which are most often associated with
either cognitive, affective, social, or sensorimotor dysfunc-
tion. Finally, neurobiology searches for the brain’s neural
activity during various cognitive, affective, social and sen-
sorimotor tasks, such as task-evoked activity, and, more re-
cently, investigates the brain’s spontaneous or resting state
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activity. All these disciplines seem employ different presu-
positions and concepts, which seem – at least to a certain
extent – to be incompatible with each other.
How can these diciplines be linked to each other without
amalgamating or reducing the former to the latter? For
that, Boeker et al. [2] argued, a common framework with
common shared features is necessary. Based on their own
investigations, they suggest that such a common frame-
work consists in spatiotemporal features [43, 46, 112–115].
By spatiotemporal features they do not mean the observ-
able discrete point in time and space but rather structure,
form and relation that as such are virtual and not observ-
able rather than real and observable. It may be supposed
that such spatiotemporal structure enables the description
of psychodynamic mechanisms (such as defense mecha-
nisms), psychopathology (such as depression as paradig-
matic example), and neuroscience (such as relationships
between different neural networks within the brain’s spon-
taneous activity as paradigmatic example). Therefore, psy-
chopathological symptoms are considered as spatiotem-
poral symptoms of altered neuro-psychodynamic
mechanisms based on the spontaneous activity’s spa-
tiotemporal pattern [87].
Conclusion and outlook
Neurobiology can potentially benefit psychiatry and psy-
chotherapy in many different perspectives [2], for instance:
– Breaking down stigmas and taboos about mental ill-
ness,
– Development of a stronger position among the general
public and in government healthcare policies,
– Better understanding of the aetiology involved, and of
how physiological and mental aspects of psychiatric
disorders are linked,
– Aiming at neurobiological variables in psychotherapeu-
tic treatment,
– Better understanding of the interaction between various
brain regions, and
– Development of selective rules for indications using
neurobiological predictors.
Nevertheless, the limits and possible risks that may be
involved in neuroscientific approaches and, in the worst
case, their one-dimensional application, should not be
overlooked. Fuchs [116] emphasised that a neurobiological
view of mental disorders and their treatment can always
become problematic, “if neurobiological approaches are no
longer considered an alternative and complement to psy-
chological models and procedures, but claim to have the
absolute sovereignty of interpretation in human science.”
Recent studies have shown a relationship between such re-
ductionistic biological interpretations of psychiatric illness
and the empathy shown by the clinician concerned: for ex-
ample, Lebowitz and Ahn [117] reported on “unintention-
al negative consequences of exclusively biological models
of illness depending on how the therapeutical relationship
was built, on how the symptoms were perceived, interpret-
ed and dealt with, and also particuarly depending on the
therapist´s empathy.”
Psychodynamic psychiatry and neuropsychodynamic psy-
chiatry may bridge psychiatry and neuroscience, thus con-
tributing essentially to the bio-psycho-social model of psy-
chiatry. Spatiotemporal psychopathology assumes
correspondence and continuity between the spatial and
temporal features of the brain’s spontaneous activity on the
one hand and the spatial and temporal structure underly-
ing psychopathological symptoms on the other [2, 43, 46].
Such spatiotemporal correspondence was exemplified by
ruminations and the experience of loss of the self in de-
pression. Spatiotemporal continuity is disrupted in for in-
stance schizophrenia which may be central in constituting
hallucinations and delusions.
Possible therapeutic consequences of the neuro-psychody-
namic approach to depression involve the necessary emo-
tional attunement in psychotherapy of depressed patients
and the adequate timing of therapeutic interventions [15,
80] the development of therapeutic interventions which
strengthen the spatio-temporal structure of the self in
schizophrenic patients, and the reduction of the possible
countertransfrence-resistence of the therapist [87].
Psychotherapy is susccessful bringing about substantive
changes in behaviour; it does so by producing alterations
in gene expression that produce new functional and struc-
tural changes in the brain [3].
Beyond former, often one-sided, interpretations of neu-
ronal and mental phenomena and categorial controverses
between different disciplines Neurobiology may contribute
to the development of psychodynamic psychiatry and, vice
versa, psychodynamic psychiatry may contribute to neu-
robiology, especially to first-person-neuroscience. This de-
velopment may lead near to Freud's vision in his “Project
for a Scientific Psychology” [118]:
“The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a
natural science: that is to represent psychical processes
as quantitatively determinant states of specifiable material
particals, thus making those processes perspicuous and
free from contradiction.”
Psychodynamic psychiatry is part of the bio-psycho-social
model of psychiatry, and it will contribute to the future
brain-mind-debate in general, and the critical dialogue in
the debate on future directions in psychiatry and the epis-
temological framework invoved in special [119]: “The de-
bate on future directions of psychiatric diagnosis critically
depends on a sustained and substantial reflection on the
epistemological framework involved. For example, how
shall we integrate the notions of subjectivity, autonomy,
and personhood with neuroscientific data? In order to justi-
fy the designation of an important realm of current psychi-
atric research as social neuroscience, this question has to
be answered. The proposals of ‘first person neuroscience’
and ‘two person neuroscience’ are attempts to get ahead
with this issue.”
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